Contributed research papers presented at a National Seminar organized under the joint auspices of Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Tirupati and Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi from 27th to 29th March 2004 at R.S. Vidyapeeth, Tirupati.

MATERIALISTS claim that in principle mentality could be accounted for entirely by properties of matter. They must, of course, clarify, as far as possible, the precise scope of the concept "properties of matter." According to materialists there exists only one type of "substance" in the universe, namely matter. Sophisticated experimental and theoretical analyses have led contemporary physicists to interpret known material entities as being composed of two classes of elementary particles, namely quarks and leptons and constituents of interaction fields that (...) mediate interactions between some or all of the elementary particles and which comprise photons, gluons, intermediate bosons and gravitons. For instance, protons and neutrons are composed--by hypothesis--of quarks, while electrons are probably the most familiar leptons. Whether any analyzed and postulated elementary particles and constituents of interaction fields are "ultimate" components of matter can never be known. It remains always possible that more basic subcomponents of known components will be discovered. This has happened repeatedly throughout the history of physics. Hence, what physicists understand by the "physical properties" of the basic components of matter must always remain expressed in terms of usually intricate hypothetico-deductive theories which are tentative and fallible. Contemporary relativistic quantum mechanics of elementary particles and of interaction fields provide typical examples of such hypothetico-deductive theories relating to present known basic components of matter. (shrink)

SummaryExtremism in the environment‐versus innateness controversy in the behavioural sciences and in human sociobiology is being examined. Genetic effects can be severely modified or overruled by environmental factors, but may, nevertheless, be important. Dawkins' view that we are survival machines programmed to subserve selfish genes seems untenable and is a root of racialism. It is also argued that morality is compatible with mixed genetic and environmental control of brains via existing biological machinery.

We propose probability logic as an appropriate standard of reference for evaluating human inferences. Probability logical accounts of nonmonotonic reasoning with system p, and conditional syllogisms (modus ponens, etc.) are explored. Furthermore, we present categorical syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers, like the “most . . . ” quantifier. While most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies, we summarize our empirical studies on human nonmonotonic reasoning.

The present chapter describes a probabilistic framework of human reasoning. It is based on probability logic. While there are several approaches to probability logic, we adopt the coherence based approach.

We comment on the previous paper by L. Basano. In particular, we show that its Section 2 is kinematically incorrect (the dynamics of a two-body interaction through tachyon exchange, incidentally, has already been thoroughly expounded in one paper of ours). Its Section 1 is simply a rather subjective introduction. As to its Section 3, containing indeed interesting problems, we again briefly refer to our earlier work. Our conclusions are still in favor of “au revoir to tachyons!,” even if it is (...) known that inside our cosmos tachyons are more likely to have a role in physics (e.g., in elementary particle and black-hole physics) as “exchanged objects” rather than as “asymptotically free” objects. (shrink)